We consider the cryptographic group of Signed Quadratic Residues. This group is particularly useful for cryptography since it is a "gap-group," in which the computational problem (i.e., computing square roots) is as hard as factoring, while the corresponding decisional problem (i.e., recognizing signed quadratic residues) is easy. We are able to show that under the factoring assumption, the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption over the signed quadratic residues holds. That is, in this group the Diffie-Hellman problem is hard, even in the presence of a Decisional Diffie-Hellman oracle.
Introduction

Quadratic Residues
The group of quadratic residues QR N over a Blum integer N = P Q (where P ≡ Q ≡ 3 mod 4) has proven to be a useful group for cryptographic purposes. For example, Rabin [31] proved that computing square roots in this group is equivalent to factoring the modulus N . The latter is believed to be hard in general ("factoring assumption"). Rabin's fundamental observation is the basis for a number of cryptographic protocols that are provably secure under the factoring assumption (e.g., the encryption and signature schemes from [31, 6, 22] ).
The quadratic residues have yet another useful property. Namely, given a uniformly random element modulo N (with Jacobi symbol 1), it is believed to be hard to decide whether the element is a square or not. This is the quadratic residuosity assumption, a stronger assumption than the factoring assumption. On the bright side, there are again numerous cryptographic protocols whose security relies on the quadratic residuosity assumption (e.g., [19, 12] ).
However, the quadratic residuosity assumption also has a dark side. Namely, whenever an active adversary may choose group elements as protocol inputs (such as ciphertexts submitted for decryption), the receiving (honest) party may not be able to distinguish quadratic residues from quadratic non-residues. In particular, the adversary may learn some secret information by observing the protocol's different behaviour on quadratic residues and non-residues. Concretely, this problem naturally occurs when trying to reduce the chosen-ciphertext security (CCA security) of an encryption scheme (defined over the quadratic residues) to the factoring assumption. Specifically, during such a reduction, a decryption oracle has to be implemented without the knowledge of the factorization of N . Hence, the decryption oracle cannot distinguish quadratic residues from non-residues. This allows an adversary that uses the decryption oracle to submit, say, both C ∈ Z * N and −C ∈ Z * N (one of which is not a square) for decryption. This makes implementing a decryption oracle harder, in particular since the the submitted non-squares could be related to the challenge ciphertext.
Another intractability problem commonly used in cryptography is the Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem [14] . Given a generator g of a cyclic group G and X = g x , Y = g y , the DH key is defined as DH g (X, Y ) = g xy . The (Computational) DH problem is to compute DH g (X, Y ) from g, X, Y . For passive (chosen-plaintext) adversaries the security of the DH key exchange protocol [14] and the ElGamal encryption scheme [16] is equivalent to the DH problem. Over the group of quadratic residues (i.e., if G = QR N ), Shmuely [33] and McCurley [28] proved that the DH problem is at least as hard as factoring N .
The Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) problem [1] is to compute DH g (X, Y ) from g, X, Y while having access to a (Decisional) DH oracle that returns 1 on input (Ŷ ,Ẑ) if DH g (X,Ŷ ) =Ẑ and (Ŷ ,Ẑ) ∈ G × G (and 0 otherwise). Interestingly, for active (chosen-ciphertext) adversaries, the security of the (hashed) Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [14] and the Hybrid ElGamal encryption scheme [16] is equivalent to the SDH problem [10] in the random oracle model [3] . However, the result of Shmuely does not extend to prove that the SDH problem is at least as hard as factoring, since the DH oracle can be used to determine membership in the quadratic residues.
Signed Quadratic Residues
We propose to use a cryptographic group we call the Signed Quadratic Residues (QR + N ). This group has been suggested already by Fischlin and Schnorr in [17, Section 6] (in the different context of hard-core bits for generalized Rabin functions), but has not been investigated any further. This group is useful for cryptography since membership in QR + N can be publicly (and efficiently) verified while it inherits some nice intractability properties of the quadratic residues. For example, computing square roots in QR + N is also equivalent to factoring the modulus N . We therefore have a "gap group" [30] , in which the computational problem (i.e., computing a square root) is as hard as factoring, whereas the corresponding decisional problem (i.e., deciding if an element is a signed square) is easy. We can apply this observation to the Diffie-Hellman assumption. Namely, we extend Shmuely's result to show that in the group of signed quadratic residues, the Strong Diffie-Hellman problem is implied by the factoring assumption.
Concretely, the signed quadratic residues, QR 
Hybrid ElGamal over the Signed Quadratic Residues
The Hybrid ElGamal encryption scheme combines the original ElGamal encryption scheme with a hash function for key derivation and a symmetric cipher. As "Diffie-Hellman integrated encryption scheme" (DHIES) [1] it is contained in several standards bodies for public-key encryption, e.g., in IEEE P1363a, SECG, and ISO 18033-2. We consider the security of Hybrid ElGamal when implemented over the group of signed quadratic residues.
CCA security in the random oracle model under the factoring assumption. It is well known [1, 13] that Hybrid ElGamal is CCA secure in the random oracle model under the SDH assumption. Recall that we show that the SDH assumption in the group of signed quadratic residues is implied by the factoring assumption. Hence, as an immediate application of our results, we obtain that Hybrid ElGamal over the signed quadratic residues is CCA secure in the random oracle model under the factoring assumption. (We emphasize that while the security proofs for Hybrid ElGamal from [1, 13] are formulated for prime-order subgroups of Z * p , they do not use knowledge about the order of the platform group, and hold literally in the group of signed quadratic residues.)
CCA security in the standard model under the higher residuosity assumption. Using completely different techniques, we show the Hybrid ElGamal over the signed quadratic residues is CCA secure in the standard model under the higher residuosity assumption [20] . 1 This result is obtained by applying the recent "randomness extraction framework" by [23] to a specific "high-entropic" hash proof system whose subset membership problem is hard assuming the higher residuosity assumption. We stress that this is the first security result for Hybrid ElGamal in the standard model from a non-interactive computational assumption.
Other applications
Security of Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Similar to the Hybrid ElGamal scheme, the (hashed) Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [14] can be proven secure against active attacks in the random oracle model under the SDH assumption ([10, Theorem 5]). As with Hybrid ElGamal, the security proof does not use knowledge about the order of the platform group, and hence holds literally over the signed quadratic residues. In particular, we can employ our result about the SDH assumption in the group of signed quadratic residues. We get that the (hashed) Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is secure against active attacks in the random oracle model under the factoring assumption, when implemented over the signed quadratic residues.
Simplifying security proofs. As hinted above, encryption schemes that are already formulated over the quadratic residues have to take into account that the set of quadratic residues is not (or, rather, not known to be) efficiently recognizable. In particular, e.g., ciphertexts submitted for decryption may be non-squares. The usual way to deal with this problem is to first square the group elements supplied to decryption, and to "make up for this additional squaring" in the subsequent processing. Additionally, these works already propose to restrict the set of allowed ciphertexts to signed quadratic residues (e.g., to prevent an adversary to submit both C and −C for decryption). Hence, the group of signed quadratic residues is implicitly used, but only to "transport" quadratic residues. Our proposal here is to work in the group of signed quadratic residues altogether, whenever a reduction to the factoring assumption is desired. Because the group of signed quadratic residues is efficiently recognizable, this avoids the extra squaring step and the connected complications. In particular, we can simplify both scheme and security proof of the CCA-secure encryption scheme from [22] . This results in a slight efficiency gain, since we save a few modular squarings. (For completeness, the new scheme is sketched in Appendix B.) We stress that these modifications do not affect the actual reduction to factoring. 2 
Related work
To the best of our knowledge, the group of signed quadratic residues appears first in [17] in the context of hard-core bits for generalized Rabin functions. Furthermore, as explained above, it has been used implicitly in several encryption schemes to "transport" quadratic residues, e.g., in [27, 9, 22] . The security of Hybrid ElGamal has been investigated in [13, 26] in the random oracle model, and in [1] in the standard model. In particular, the latter work derives CCA security results for Hybrid ElGamal under the (interactive) "oracle Diffie-Hellman" assumption. The (non-interactive) computational assumption that we employ to show CCA security of Hybrid ElGamal has been suggested and used in [18, 7] , also with the goal to construct hash proof systems for the use in encryption schemes. However, the encryption schemes from [18, 7] are less efficient than Hybrid ElGamal due to the fact that they do not use randomness extraction techniques, but instead build on the Cramer-Shoup, resp. Kurosawa-Desmedt paradigms [12, 24] . The paper [10] has a similar overall goal as ours. They propose the "Twin Diffie-Hellman" (2DH) assumption and show that the (interactive) Strong 2DH assumption is implied by the standard DH assumption. However, to be able to use this new assumption to prove security of the schemes of interest (among others also the Hybrid ElGamal and the Diffie-Hellman keyexchange protocol) they have to modify the schemes. Our results directly yield a security proof for the above schemes when instantiated in the specific group of signed quadratic residues.
Preliminaries
Notation
If k ∈ N then 1 k denotes the string of k ones. If r ≥ 1 is a rational number then [r] = {1, . . . , r }. If S is a set then s ← R S denotes the operation of picking an element s of S uniformly at random. We write A(x, y, . . .) to indicate that A is an algorithm with inputs x, y, . . . and by z ← R A(x, y, . . .) we denote the operation of running A with inputs (x, y, . . .) and letting z be the output. We write lg x for logarithms over the reals with base 2. The min-entropy of a random variable X is defined as H ∞ (X) = − lg(max x∈X Pr[X = x]). If X is an element of a cyclic group G = g , we write dlog g X for the smallest non-negative integer x with X = g x .
Public-Key Encryption
A public key encryption scheme PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec) with message space M(k) consists of three polynomial time algorithms (PTAs), of which the first two, Kg and Enc, are probabilistic and the last one, Dec, is deterministic. Public/secret keys for security parameter k ∈ N are generated using (pk , sk ) ← R Kg(1 k ). Given such a key pair, a message m ∈ M(k) is encrypted by C ← R Enc(pk , m); a ciphertext is decrypted by m ← R Dec(sk, C ), where possibly Dec outputs ⊥ to denote an invalid ciphertext. For consistency, we require that for all k ∈ N, all 2 It is easy to see that squaring is a one-way permutation (as hard to invert as factoring N ) also in the signed quadratic residues. Furthermore, the least significant bit of the squaring function (over the signed quadratic residues) is hard-core, see [17] who consider the "absolute Rabin function E a N ." messages m ∈ M(k), it must hold that Pr[Dec(sk , Enc(pk , m)) = m] = 1 where the probability is taken over the above randomized algorithms and (pk , sk ) ← R Kg(1 k ).
The security we require for PKE is IND-CCA security [32, 15] . We define the advantage of an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) as
The adversary A 2 is restricted not to query Dec(sk , ·) with C * . PKE scheme PKE is said to be indistinguishable against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA secure in short) if the advantage function Adv cca PKE,A (k) is a negligible function in k for all efficient A.
Symmetric Encryption
A symmetric encryption scheme SE = (E, D) is specified by its encryption algorithm E (encrypting m ∈ M(k) with keys S ∈ K SE (k)) and decryption algorithm D (returning m ∈ M(k) or ⊥).
Here we restrict ourselves to deterministic algorithms E and D.
The most common notion of security for symmetric encryption is that of (one-time) ciphertext indistinguishability (IND-OT), which requires that all efficient adversaries fail to distinguish between the encryptions of two messages of their choice. Another common security requirement is ciphertext authenticity. (One-time) ciphertext integrity (INT-OT) requires that no efficient adversary can produce a new valid ciphertext under some key when given one encryption of a message of his choice under the same key. A symmetric encryption scheme which satisfies both requirements simultaneously is called secure in the sense of authenticated encryption (AE-OT secure). Symmetric ciphers secure in the sense of AE-OT can be constructed (following the encrypt-then-mac approach [2, 13] ) from a IND-OT secure symmetric encryption scheme and a MAC. Note that AE-OT security is a stronger notion than one-time chosen-ciphertext security (IND-OTCCA) [2, 13] . Formal definitions and constructions can be looked up in, e.g., [21] .
Hash functions
Let H be a family of hash functions H : X → Y . With |H| we denote the number of functions in this family and when sampling from H we assume a uniform distribution. Let k > 1 be an integer, the hash-family H is k-wise independent if for any sequence of distinct elements x 1 , . . . , x k ∈ X the random variables H(x 1 ), . . . , H(x k ), where H ← R H, are uniform random.
3 The group of Signed Quadratic Residues
Quadratic Residues
An n-bit integer N = P Q is called an RSA modulus if P and Q are two distinct n/2-bit odd primes. N is called a Blum integer is it is an RSA modulus and P and Q are both congruent 3 modulo 4. The group Z * N consists of all elements of Z N that have an inverse modulo N and has order φ(N ) = (P − 1)(Q − 1). (Here φ(N ) is Euler's Phi function.) By J N we denote the subgroup of all elements from Z * N with Jacobi symbol 1. J N has index 2 in Z * N and has order (P −1)(Q−1)/2. Since N is Blum, −1 ∈ J N . By QR N we denote the group of quadratic residues modulo N . Note that QR N is a subgroup of J N with index 2 and has order (P − 1)(Q − 1)/4.
We remark that recognizing elements in QR N is generally believed to be a hard problem (the quadratic residuosity problem).
Signed Quadratic Residues
Let N be an integer. For x ∈ Z N we define |x| as the absolute value of x, where x is represented as a signed integer in the set {−(N − 1)/2, . . . , (N − 1)/2}. For a sub-group G of Z * N with −1 ∈ G we define the "signed group", G + , as the quotiont group
For and g, h ∈ G and an integer x we define
More complicated expressions in the exponents are computed modulo the group order, e.g.,
Let N be a Blum integer such that −1 ∈ QR N . We will mainly be interested in QR + N , which we call signed quadratic residues (modulo N ). QR + N can be thought of as subgroups of Z * N /±1, with absolute values as a convenient computational representation. The following basic facts have already been noted in [17] . 
Factoring Assumption
RSA Instance Generator. Let 0 ≤ δ < 1/2 be a constant and n(k) be a function. Let RSAgen be an algorithms that generates elements (N, P, Q), such that N = P Q is an n-bit Blum integer and all prime factors of φ(N )/4 are pairwise distinct and at least δn bit integers. 3 A special case is given when P and Q are strong primes (i.e., P = 2P + 1 and Q = 2Q + 1 for two distinct primes P , Q ) but we prefer to state our results more generally.
Factoring assumption. The factoring assumption is that computing P, Q from N (generated by RSAgen) is hard. We write
The factoring assumption for RSAgen holds if Adv fac A,RSAgen (k) is negligible for all efficient A.
3 The "only large prime-factor" requirement is needed to ensure that the square of a random element in Z * N is a generator of QR N with overwhelming probability 1 − O(2 −δn(k) ). The requirement that all prime factors are distinct ensures that JN is cyclic.
Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption
Let G be a finite cyclic group whose order is not necessarily known. The Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem in G is to compute DH g (X, Y ) := g (dlog g X)(dlog g Y ) from (G, g, X, Y ) for a uniform generator g and uniform X, Y ∈ G. The strong Diffie-Hellman problem [1] is the same as the DH problem, but now the adversary has access to a Decision Diffie-Hellman oracle for fixed g and X, which is defined as DDH g,X (Ŷ ,Ẑ) = 1 ifŶ dlog g X =Ẑ (and DDH g,X (Ŷ ,Ẑ) = 0 else), where (Ŷ ,Ẑ) ∈ G × G. We do not define DDH g,X in inputs (Ŷ ,Ẑ) ∈ G × G, since we assume that G is efficiently recognizable. For our purposes, we will consider the group (QR + N , •), i.e., the group of signed quadratic residues.
To an adversary A and RSAgen we associate
The Strong DH assumption holds relative to RSAgen if Adv 
Thus, B can implement the strong DH oracle by checking whetherŶ 2a+1 ? =Ẑ 2 .
Consequently, with probability Adv 
Hybrid ElGamal over the signed quadratic residues
We recall the Hybrid ElGamal (aka DHIES) scheme from [1, 13] . There the scheme is described in a more general form over arbitrary cyclic groups. Here we restrict ourselves to the special case of QR + N , for the following choice of N : RSA Instance Generator. Let 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1/4 be a constant and n(k) be a function. Let RSAgen = RSAgen δ,n(k) be an algorithm that generates elements (N, P, Q, S), such that
• N = P Q is an n-bit Blum integer such that the prime factors of φ(N )/4 are pairwise distinct and all greater than 2 δn ; • S is an odd δn-bit prime that divides φ(N ) (so by construction gcd(S, φ(N )/(4S)) = 1). We stress, however, that we need this choice of N only for the security proof of Hybrid ElGamal in the standard model. The security proof of Hybrid ElGamal in the random oracle model (based on the hardness of factoring N ) works with RSA instances as generated by RSAgen or RSAgen.
The encryption scheme
Let SE = (E, D) be a symmetric cipher with key-space {0, 1} (k) , let H = (H k ) k∈N be a family of hash functions with H : {0, 1} 2n(k) → {0, 1} (k) for each H ∈ H k . Define the following encryption scheme HEG = (Kg, Enc, Dec): Key generation. Kg(1 k ) chooses uniformly at random -an RSA modulus N = P Q generated with RSAgen
Kg then sets X = g x ∈ QR + N and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk , where
Encryption. Enc(pk , m) chooses uniformly y ∈ [N/4], sets
and outputs the ciphertext (Y, ψ) ∈ QR + N × {0, 1} * . Decryption. Dec(sk , (Y, ψ)) verifies that Y ∈ QR + N and rejects if not. Then, Dec computes
and outputs {m, ⊥} ← D K (ψ). Note that we present the HEG scheme in a slightly generalized form for general symmetric ciphers SE, whereas in [1] , SE consisted of a particular "encrypt-then-mac"-based cipher (which is AE-OT and therefore also IND-OTCCA secure).
Security
We now state our claims about the security of HEG. We will prove that the same scheme HEG secure in the standard and in the random oracle model, under different assumptions.
Theorem 4.1 Assume the factoring assumption holds for RSAgen n(k),δ , H is modeled as a random oracle, and SE is IND-OTCCA secure. Then HEG is IND-CCA secure.
[13, Theorem 9] show that the IND-CCA security of hashed ElGamal (viewed as a key encapsulation mechanism) in the random oracle model is implied by the strong DH assumption. In Theorem A.1 (Appendix A) we formally show that their result does not use a specific group structure and can also be applied to our case. Putting Theorem 3.2 and Theorem A.1 together yields Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.2 Assume the Higher Residuosity assumption (to be introduced in Section 5) holds relative to RSAgen δ,n(k) , H is a family of 4-wise independent hash functions, and SE is AE-OT secure with -bit keys. If δn(k) ≥ 4 , then HEG is IND-CCA secure.
This theorem will be proved in Section 5.
5 A security proof in the standard model
The computational hardness assumption
To prove the security of HEG in the standard model, we will make use of the following hardness assumption.
Let (N, P, Q, S) be generated by RSAgen . We write G S for the unique subgroup of order S of Z * N . The higher residuosity (HR) assumption states that distinguishing a random element from G S from a random element from QR N is computationally infeasible. More formally, to an adversary and RSAgen we associate
where (N, P, Q, S) ← R RSAgen (1 k ), g, c ← R G S andc ← R QR N . The HR assumption for RSAgen holds if Adv hr A,RSAgen (k) is negligible for all efficient A. Note that the HR assumption implicitly depends on the choice of n(k) and δ. For concreteness, for k = 80 bits security one may choose n(k) = 1024 and δ = 1/4 such that the order of G S is a 256-bit prime.
In the literature several related assumptions can be found. Closest to our assumption are the ones in [20, 25, 18, 7] which are as our HR assumption but with a different distribution of N and/or using the groups J N , Z * N instead of QR N . Other similar assumptions were proposed in [19, 11, 25, 4, 29] . In all these assumptions the adversary is given (N, S) where S | Φ(N )/4, and has to distinguish a "random element" from one of the form x S mod N .
A variant of HEG
To prove Theorem 4.2, we will consider a slightly different scheme, HEG = (Kg , Enc, Dec). It is defined as HEG, with the only difference that in Kg , the element g from key generation is a uniform element from G A combination of the above two lemmas yields Theorem 4.2. The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Lemma 5.2.
Hash Proof Systems
We recall the notion of hash proof systems as introduced by Cramer and Shoup [12] .
Smooth Projective Hashing. Let C, K be sets and V ⊂ C a language. In the context of public-key encryption (and viewing a hash proof system as a key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) [13] with "special algebraic properties") one may think of C as the set of all ciphertexts, V ⊂ C as the set of all valid (consistent) ciphertexts, and K as the set of all symmetric keys. Let Λ sk : C → K be a hash function indexed with sk ∈ SK, where SK is a set. A hash function Λ sk is projective if there exists a projection µ : SK → PK such that µ(sk ) ∈ PK defines the action of Λ sk over the subset V. That is, for every C ∈ V, the value K = Λ sk (C) is uniquely determined by µ(sk ) and C. In contrast, nothing is guaranteed for C ∈ C \ V, and it may not be possible to compute Λ sk (C) from µ(sk ) and C. Following [23] we make the following two definitions about projective hash functions. The projective hash function is κ-entropic if for all C ∈ C \ V, H ∞ (Λ sk (C) | pk ) ≥ κ where in the above pk = µ(sk ) for sk ← R SK. We furthermore define the collision probability as
Hash Proof System. A hash proof system HPS = (Par, Pub, Priv) consists of three algorithms. The randomized algorithm Par(1 k ) generates parametrized instances of par = (group, K, C, V, PK, SK, Λ (·) : C → K, µ : SK → PK), where group may contain some additional structural parameters. The deterministic public evaluation algorithm Pub inputs the projection key pk = µ(sk ), C ∈ V and a witness r of the fact that C ∈ V and returns K = Λ sk (C). The deterministic private evaluation algorithm Priv inputs sk ∈ SK and returns Λ sk (C), without knowing a witness. We further assume that µ is efficiently computable and that there are efficient algorithms given for sampling sk ∈ SK, sampling C ∈ V uniformly (or negligibly close to) together with a witness r, sampling C ∈ C uniformly (given sk ), and for checking membership in C. Following [24] we also require that the subset membership problem can be efficiently solved with a master trapdoor.
Subset Membership Problem. As computational problem we require that the subset membership problem is hard in HPS. That is, for random C 0 ∈ V and random C 1 ∈ C \ V the two elements C 0 and C 1 are computationally indistinguishable. This is captured by defining the advantage function Adv sm HPS,A (k) of an adversary A as
where C is taken from the output of Par(1 k ), C 1 ← R C and C 0 ← R C \ V.
IND-CCA secure encryption via randomness extraction
We recall the randomness extraction framework [23] that (building on [24, 12] ) transforms any κ-entropic HPS with hard subset membership problem into a IND-CCA secure encryption scheme.
Let HPS = (Par, Pub, Priv) be a hash proof system, let H be a family of hash functions with H : K → {0, 1} (k) and let SE = (E, D) be an AE-OT secure symmetric encryption scheme with key-space K SE = {0, 1} (k) . We build a public-key encryption scheme PKE HPS = (Kg, Enc, Dec) as follows. Key generation. Kg(1 k ) picks par ← R Par(1 k ), sk ← R SK and defines pk = µ(sk ) ∈ PK.
Next, it picks a random hash function H ← R H. The public-key is (par , H, pk ), the secretkey is (par , H, sk ). Encryption. Enc(pk , m) picks C ← R V together with its witness r that C ∈ V. The session key K = H(Λ sk (C)) ∈ {0, 1} is computed as K ← H(Pub(pk , C, r)). The symmetric ciphertext is ψ ← E K (m). The ciphertext is (C , ψ). Decryption. Dec(sk , C ) first checks if C ∈ C and rejects if not. Otherwise, it reconstructs the symmetric key K = H(Λ sk (C)) as K ← H(Priv(sk , C)) and return {m, ⊥} ← D K (ψ).
Theorem 5.3 [23] Assume HPS is κ(k)-entropic with hard subset membership problem and negligible collision probability, H is a family of 4-wise independent hash functions with H : K → {0, 1} (k) , and SE is AE-OT secure. If κ(k) ≥ 2( (k) + k) then PKE HPS is secure in the sense of IND-CCA.
A hash proof system for HEG
We now give a hash proof system HPS that yields the encryption scheme HEG via the transformation given in the last subsection. Define group = (N, g), where (N, P, Q, S) ← R RSAgen (1 k ) and g is a uniform generator of G 
This defines Priv(sk , C). Given pk = µ(sk ), C ∈ V and a witness r ∈ Z such that C = g r , public evaluation Pub(pk , C, r) computes K = Λ sk (C) as
The trapdoor ω is the order of the group S. This completes the description of HPS. Note that PKE HPS is exactly HEG . Therefore the proof Lemma 5.2 follows by combining Theorem 5.3 with the following.
Lemma 5.4
Under the HR assumption, the subset membership problem is hard in HPS. Furthermore, HPS is δn(k)-entropic with collision probability δ = 0.
Proof: The subset membership problem is hard in HPS by definition of the HR assumption. The collision probability δ is zero since Λ sk (C) = (C, C x ) contains the element C. To show that HPS is δn(k)-entropic we consider an element C ∈ C \ V = QR
T is a cyclic group of order T = (P − 1)(Q − 1)/(4S) with gcd(T, S) = 1. Since T has only prime factors greater than 2 δn(k) , ord(C) ≥ 2 δn(k) and gcd(ord(C), S) = 1. Then, given N , g, pk = µ(sk ) = X = g x , and any C ∈ C \ V,
This completes the proof.
Extensions
If one only requires a scheme that is IND-CCA secure in the standard model from the HR assumption, the one can turn encryption in HEG slightly more efficient by choosing y ← The adaptations to [13, Theorem 9] are merely syntactic, and below we provide a short proof sketch. Putting Theorem 3.2 and Theorem A.1 together yields Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem A.1: (Sketch.) We proceed in games.
Game 0. Let Game 0 be the original IND-CCA experiment with scheme HEG and adversary A.
Here and in the following games, p i denotes the probability that the experiment outputs 1, i.e., that b =b, in Game i. By definition,
Game 1. In Game 1, we modify the encryption of the challenge ciphertext (Y * , ψ * ). Namely, now the symmetric ciphertext ψ * is generated with an independent, uniform symmetric key K as ψ * := E K (m b ). Decryption queries of the form (Y * , ψ) (for arbitrary ψ = ψ * ) are treated as if Y * decrypted to key K (and not key K * = H(Y * , Z * ) for Z * = Y * x ). Let F denote the event that A queries the random oracle H with (Y * , Z * ). (F is defined in both Game 0 and Game 1.) Note that the views of A are identical in Game 0 and Game 1 unless F occurs. Hence,
Furthermore, we can build an adversary B on the strong DH assumption, such that
Concretely, B DDH g,X (·,·) (N, g, X, Y * ) simulates Game 1 with public key (N, g, X, H), and challenge ciphertext (Y * , ψ * ) := (Y, E K (m b )). Adversary A's decryption queries (Ŷ ,ψ) are answered as follows (note that B does not know the secret key x = dlog g X, and hence cannot decrypt directly). If A has already made an H-query H(Ŷ ,Ẑ) for which DDH g,X (Ŷ ,Ẑ) = 1, thenẐ =Ŷ x , so the keyK := H(Ŷ ,Ẑ) can be used to decryptψ. If on the other hand A made no such query, the hash value H(Ŷ ,Ẑ) for the "right"Ẑ =Ŷ x has not yet been defined, and a symmetric keyK can be freely invented (and then be used to decryptψ). Note that in the latter case, care must be taken that once A makes an H-query H(Ŷ ,Ẑ) with DDH g,X (Ŷ ,Ẑ) = 1 later on, then the right valueK is returned.
If at any point, event F occurs, then A has submitted an H-query (Y, Z) for Z = Y x and effectively solved B's own DH challenge. This can be noticed by B (with the help of oracle DDH g,X (·, ·)), and B can return Z. Game 2. We now change the symmetric part ψ * of the challenge ciphertext into ψ * := E K (R) for a uniform bit-string R of length |m 0 | = |m 1 |. Note that from Game 1 on, the symmetric key K used to produce ψ * is chosen independently. Furthermore, K is only needed to perform decryptions of ciphertexts ψ = ψ * as required for ciphertexts (Y * , ψ). Hence, we have
for a suitable IND-CCA adversary B on SE.
On the other hand, p 2 = 1/2 since A's view in Game 2 is independent of b.
Putting (3, 4, 5, 6) together yields the statement of Theorem A.1.
B The encryption scheme from [22] over the signed quadratic residues
We recall the public-key encryption scheme from [22] and apply straightforward simplifications when implemented over the group of signed quadratic residues. For a product N = P Q of two primes P, Q and u ∈ Z N , let BBS N (u) = LSB N (u), LSB N (u 2 ) . . . , LSB N (u
) ∈ {0, 1} K denote the "Blum-Blum-Shub" generator [5] . Furthermore, let T : Z N → {0, . . . , 2 T − 1} be a target-collision resistant hash function. The encryption scheme (presented as a key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) [13] ) is defined as follows. Key generation. Kg(1 k ) chooses uniformly at random -an RSA modulus N = P Q generated with RSAgen(1 k ), -a generator g of QR holds, and rejects if not. If (7) holds, Dec computes a, b, c ∈ Z such that 2 c = gcd(t, 2 K + T ) = at + b2 K + T .
Note that 0 ≤ c ≤ T since 0 ≤ t ≤ 2 T − 1. Then, Dec derives
and from this K = BBS N (T ) ∈ {0, 1} K , which is the output. It is easy to see that the security proof of [22] carries over to this simplified scheme.
Theorem B.1 [22] Assume T is a target collision resistant hash function and the factoring assumption holds. Then the scheme above is IND-CCA secure.
